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THE PRIVACY RIGHTS OF RAPE VICTIMS IN
THE MEDIA AND THE LAW*
PERSPECTIVES ON DISCLOSING RAPE
VICTIMS' NAMES
DEBORAH W. DENNO **
In this Essay, Professor Denno examines the century-long conflict between an
individual's right to privacy and the freedom of the press in the context of the
media's disclosure of rape victims' names. Part I briefly reviews the United States
Supreme Court's primary rulings on this topic, explaining that the Court has
generally protected the freedom of the press under the First Amendment Part I
emphasizes, however, that the Court has left available an opportunity for a con-
trary interpretation under certain circumstances in Florida Star v. BJ.F., the
Court's last ruling concerning the disclosure of rape victims' names. Part I1 dis-
cusses some of the major arguments for and against disclosing rape victims'
names. For example, while proponents of disclosure insist that withholding the
victims' names increases the stigma attached to rape, opponents claim that this
very stigma justifies why rape and its victims should be treated differently. This
Essay concludes by raising pertinent questions, unanswered by past cases, that
may provide additional considerations for the future. Lastly, the Essay in-
troduces commentary on this topic by Michael Gartner, Linda Fairstein, and
Helen Benedict
INTRODUCTION
T7HE great majority of news organizations in this country do not pub-
the names of alleged rape victims either at the time the rape is
reported or when the victim testifies at trial.' This "conspiracy of si-
lence"2 is based, in part, on the media's recognition that rape is more
personal, traumatic, and stigmatizing than other crimes.' Rape victims
* This Symposium, given at Fordham Law School on January 28, 1993, was co-
sponsored by the Fordham Law Review and the Fordham Law Women. What follows is
an essay written by Professor Denno and commentaries based upon remarks given at the
Symposium by Michael Gartner, Linda Fairstein, and Helen Benedict.
** Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 1974, Uni-
versity of Virginia; M.A., 1975, University of Toronto; Ph.D., 1982, J.D., 1989, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania. I am most grateful to Michael Martin for comments and to Andrea
Califano and Yvette LeRoy for research assistance.
1. See William Glaberson, Times Article Naming Rape Accuser Ignites Debate on
Journalistic Values, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1991, at A14 (explaining that prior to the Wil-
liam Kennedy Smith case, "virtually all" major news organizations protected the identi-
ties of alleged rape victims unless the victims chose otherwise); Alex S. Jones, Naming
Rape Victim is Still a Murky Issue for the Press, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1989, at A18(providing an estimate from Deni Elliott, executive director of the Institute for the Study
of Applied and Professional Ethics at Dartmouth College, that 90 to 95% of news organi-
zations do not disclose rape victims' names).
2. Michael Gartner, Naming Rape Victims:" Usually, There Are Good Reasons to Do
It, USA Today, Apr. 22, 1991, at 6A.
3. See Deirdre Carmody, News Media's Use of Accuser's Name is Debated, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 18, 1991, at A22 ("[Tihe prevailing view has been that there is a particular
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are also treated differently than other crime victims by American society
and the criminal justice system.4
Two years ago,5 NBC Nightly News sparked a nationwide debate6
when it broadcasted the name of the woman who had accused William
Kennedy Smith of rape after her identity had been disclosed by two tab-
loids.7 The accuser had not wanted her name revealed and was said to
have been "shocked" by NBC's decision.' Although several news organ-
izations,9 including The New York Times,"0 subsequently revealed the ac-
cuser's name, the other major television networks and most media did
not.1
To date, the United States Supreme Court has protected a news organ-
ization's decision to disclose a rape victim's name1 2 even though three
stigma to being a rape victim that makes it incumbent upon news organizations to respect
the victim's privacy."); Jones, supra note 1, at A18 (explaining that many editors and
publishers were persuaded not to identify rape victims based upon feminists' assertions
that victims were being "raped twice," first by their assailants and then by the newspa-
pers that exposed them to the public); To Name or Not: Palm Beach Rape Case Splits
Media, Atlanta J. & Const., Apr. 18, 1991, at E2 (noting that since the late 1970s, the
media have "almost unanimously agreed" to refrain from identifying rape victims due to
the social stigma).
4. See generally Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale L.J. 1087 (1986) (discussing rape and
focusing on sexism); Paul Marcus & Tara L. McMahon, Limiting Disclosure on Rape
Victims' Identities, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1020, 1030-36 (1991) (discussing the stigma at-
tached to rape).
5. NBC Nightly News (NBC television broadcast, Apr. 16, 1991).
6. See Glaberson, supra note 1, at A14 (noting that the disclosure of the rape vic-
tim's name by news organization "ignited a bitter debate across the country"); James
Warren, Naming Rape Victims a Debate for Media, Chi. Trib., Apr. 18, 1991, § 1 (News),
at 5 (explaining the opposing views expressed by the media on revealing rape victims'
names).
7. The accuser's identity was first disclosed in The Sunday Mirror, a British tabloid,
on April 7, 1991, along with her photograph and a lurid description of the alleged inci-
dent. Her name and the same photograph were then published a week later in the Globe,
a supermarket tabloid based in Boca Raton, Florida. See Gary F. Giampetruzzi, Note,
Raped Once, But Violated Twice: Constitutional Protection of a Rape Victim's Privacy, 66
St. John's L. Rev. 151, 151 (1992).
8. See Warren, supra note 6, at 5.
9. Included among the news organizations that identified the accuser were The Des
Moines Register, The San Francisco Chronicle, The Denver Post, The Fort Worth Star-
Telegram, and The Courier-Journal of Louisville, Kentucky. See Carmody, supra note 3,
at A22.
10. The New York Times revealed the accuser's name in a lengthy profile about her
life. See Fox Butterfield with Mary B. W. Tabor, Woman in Florida Rape Inquiry Fought
Adversity and Sought Acceptance, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1991, at A17.
11. See Warren, supra note 6, at 5. For example, the other major networks, ABC,
CBS, and CNN, did not disclose the alleged victim's identity. See id.; Shann Nix, Debate
Over Naming Rape Victims, S.F. Chron., Apr. 18, 1991, at Al.
12. See infra part II.
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states-Florida, 13 South Carolina,1 4  and GeorgiaP5-have statutes
prohibiting the media from doing so. 16 Florida Star v. B.J.F.,' 7 the
Court's most recent ruling on this issue, however, has left undetermined
whether, in certain circumstances, a news organization violates a rape
victim's constitutional right to privacy by revealing her name."8
Although no news organization was found liable for revealing the alleged
rape victim's identity in the William Kennedy Smith case,19 the disclo-
sure nonetheless touched a century-long conflict between two cherished
values: the individual's right to privacy2° and the freedom of the press as
13. Under Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.03 (West 1992),
[n]o person shall print, publish, or broadcast, or cause or allow to be printed,
published, or broadcast, in any instrument of mass communication the name,
address, or other identifying fact or information of the victim of any sexual
offense within this chapter. An offense under this section shall constitute a mis-
demeanor of the second degree ....
14. Under S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-730 (Law. Co-op 1985), "[w]hoever publishes or
causes to be published the name of any person upon whom the crime of criminal sexual
conduct has been committed or alleged to have been committed in this State in any news-
paper, magazine or other publication shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ... 
15. Under Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-23 (1992),
a) It shall be unlawful for any news media or any other person to print and
publish, broadcast, televise, or disseminate through any other medium of public
dissemination or cause to be printed and published, broadcast, televised, or dis-
seminated in any newspaper, magazine, periodical, or other publication pub-
lished in this state or through any radio or television broadcast originating in
the state the name or identity of any female who may have been raped or upon
whom an assault with intent to commit the offense of rape may have been made.
b) This Code section does not apply to truthful information disclosed in
public court documents open to public inspection.
16. Although all three state statutes were originally enacted between 1911-1912, they
have become controversial only within the last two decades. See Carey Haughwout,
Prohibiting Rape Victim Identification in the Media.: Is it Constitutional?, 23 U. Tol. L
Rev. 735, 736 & n.6 (1992). Florida's law was recently examined when the State filed
criminal charges against the Globe for disclosing the alleged victim's name in the William
Kennedy Smith case. See State v. Globe Comm. Corp., No. 91-11008MM A02 at 1
(Palm Beach County Ct. Oct. 21, 1991). The court dismissed the criminal information
filed against the Globe, however, holding that the Florida statute at issue was "unconsti-
tionally broad" and unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the case. See id. at 13.
Although the state has filed a Notice of Appeal, it appears that this case has not yet been
briefed for the appellate court. See Haughwout, supra, at 736 & n.6.
Such laws have not been litigated in the criminal courts of South Carolina and Georgia
and, prior to the prosecution of the Globe, they had never been litigated in the criminal
courts in Florida. See id. at 736. The statutes have been applied in civil cases, however,
where the victims sued the media for damages relying on per se negligence standards
created through the violation of the criminal statute. See Florida Star v. BJ.F, 491 U.S.
524 (1989) (Florida statute); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)
(Georgia statute); Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 502 (4th Cir.
1963) (South Carolina statute).
17. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
18. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
19. See Haughwout, supra note 16, at 737 n.7.
20. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis proposed the concept of a common
law "right to privacy" over a century ago. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). Concerned with the intrusiveness of
the press, which they viewed as "overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
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guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 2'
This conflict between privacy and the press becomes most apparent
when the individual involved is an alleged victim of rape, a crime re-
cently characterized as "one of the more controversial and divisive issues
of our times."'22 While proponents of disclosure insist that withholding
the victims' names increases the stigma attached to rape, opponents
claim that this very stigma justifies why rape and its victims should be
treated differently.23
The purpose of this Essay is not to resolve or exhaust this debate,24 but
merely to present some of the major issues and concerns related to it.
Part I of this Essay briefly reviews the Supreme Court's primary rulings
on this topic, explaining that while the Court has protected the freedom
of the press, it has left available in Florida Star an opportunity for a
contrary interpretation under certain circumstances. Part II discusses
some of the major arguments for and against disclosing rape victims'
names. This Essay concludes by raising pertinent questions, unanswered
by past cases, that may provide additional considerations for the future.
I. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS' DISCLOSURE OF
TRUTHFUL INFORMATION
The Supreme Court generally has upheld First Amendment claims in
cases concerning the conflict between privacy rights and the freedom of
propriety and of decency," id. at 196, Warren and Brandeis suggested a common law
right of individuals "'to be let alone,'" id. at 195 (citation omitted), in order to protect
their anonymity. Several years passed before their proposal for a private torts doctrine
was adopted. See Marcus & McMahon, supra note 4, at 1036-37. Eventually, however,
an action for privacy was included in the Restatement of Torts. See Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 652D (1977) (current definition of the public disclosure tort). Today,
nearly every state recognizes, through common law or statute, some kind of right that
individuals have to control the public use of personal information about them. See Shel-
don W. Halpern, Rethinking the Right of Privacy: Dignity, Decency, and the Law's Limi-
tations, 43 Rutgers L. Rev. 539, 539-44 (1991). Such recognition, however, has resulted
in "confusion and controversy" over the boundaries and constitutional implications of
the right to privacy. Id. at 540; see Peter B. Edelman, Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by
the Ghost of Justice Black, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 1195, 1195-99 (1990). This confusion perme-
ates the debate concerning the press' right to reveal a rape victim's identity.
21. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. Const.
amend I. Under Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), the First Amendment is
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 95.
22. James J. Tomkovicz, On Teaching Rape: Reasons, Risks, and Rewards, 102 Yale
L.J. 481, 481 (1992); see also Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law § 33.01, at
515 (1987) ("No subject in the criminal law, with the possible exception of capital punish-
ment, elicits stronger feelings when discussed by lawyers and lay people alike."); Lloyd L.
Weinreb, Criminal Law: Cases, Comment, Questions 517 (5th ed. 1993) ("While public
concern about 'crime in the streets' and a loss of a sense of personal security [has] in-
creased generally, rape in particular has aroused attention and anger for reasons peculiar
to it.").
23. See infra notes 84-108 and accompanying text.
24. A fuller discussion of these topics is forthcoming. See Deborah W. Denno, Pri-
vacy and the Victim of Rape (forthcoming 1994).
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the press.2" This Part briefly examines the most significant cases com-
prising the Court's jurisprudence on the constitutionality of disclosing a
rape victim's name. It then analyzes how these cases have contributed to
Florida Star.
A. The Beginning Cases: Cox Broadcasting, Oklahoma Publishing,
and Daily Mail
The press' liability for public disclosure of true, but "private," facts
was first addressed in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.26 In that case, the
father of a deceased seventeen year-old rape victim brought suit under
Georgia's statute.27 He claimed that the defendant television station vio-
lated his right to privacy because it identified his deceased daughter by
name in a news report.28
The Court rejected this claim, however, holding that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit imposing civil liability on the news
media for disclosing true information available to the public in official
court records.2 9 The Court emphasized that "political institutions must
weigh the interests in privacy with the interests of the public to know and
of the press to publish."3 The Court concluded that the commission of a
crime and the prosecutions and judicial proceedings relating to it "are
without question events of legitimate concern to the public and conse-
quently fall within the responsibility of the press to report the operations
of government."31 Moreover, the press was to "guarantee the fairness of
trials.",32
Two years later, the Court relied on Cox Broadcasting in Oklahoma
Publishing Co. v. District Court13 and found unconstitutional a state
court's pretrial order enjoining the media from publishing the name and
picture of a juvenile obtained when the boy appeared at a juvenile deten-
25. See, eg., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (holding that the First
Amendment bars the application of a statute "to redress false reports of matters of public
interest in the absence of proof that the defendant published the report with knowledge of
its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth"); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that the First Amendment permits a public official to
recover damages for defamation only if the defamation was deliberately or recklessly
false); Kim Ruckdaschel-Haley, The Florida Star v. B.J.F.: Balancing Freedom of the
Press and the Right to Privacy Upon Publication of a Rape Victim's Identity, 35 S.D. L
Rev. 94, 102 (1990) (noting the Court's support of press freedom).
26. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
27. See supra note 15 (text of statute).
28. See Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 473-74.
29. See id. at 496.
30. Id-
31. Id at 492. Irrespective of the Court's holding in Cox Broadcasting, Florida and
South Carolina still have no statutory exception for information acquired from public
records, whereas Georgia's amended statute excludes the publication of such information.
See Haughwout, supra note 16, at 743.
32. Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 492.
33. 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam).
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tion hearing. 4 The Court stated that, irrespective of whether the judge
made an express order opening the hearing to the public, "members of
the press were in fact present at the hearing."3 5 Moreover, the name and
picture of the juvenile were" 'publicly revealed' ... much as the name of
the rape victim in Cox Broadcasting was placed in the public domain."3 6
Thereafter, in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,S the Court, relying
on both Cox Broadcasting and Oklahoma Publishing,"5 held unconstitu-
tional a West Virginia statute that provided criminal sanctions for media
that published the name of any youth charged as a juvenile offender with-
out the written approval of the juvenile court.3 9 In Daily Mail, a newspa-
per published the name of a juvenile arrested for allegedly killing another
juvenile based on information a reporter obtained from witnesses, a local
prosecutor, and police present at the crime scene.4 The Court expanded
the holding in Cox Broadcasting and determined that disclosed informa-
tion could include not only public court documents, but also information
obtained from routine reporting methods.41
Moreover, the Daily Mail Court noted that its earlier cases suggested
"strongly that if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about
a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitution-
ally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a
state interest of the highest order."42 The Court concluded that the
state's interest in protecting the anonymity of juvenile offenders for pur-
poses of rehabilitation did not constitute a sufficient "state interest of the
highest order" and did not justify criminally sanctioning and limiting the
First Amendment rights of the press.43
B. Florida Star
In Florida Star v. B.J.F.," the most provocative decision on the name
disclosure issue, the Court reversed the lower courts' findings that a
weekly newspaper was civilly liable under Florida's anti-disclosure stat-
ute 5 for publishing the name of a rape victim that the newspaper had
acquired from a publicly released police crime incident report.46 The vic-
tim's name had been inadvertently included in the police report. This
report was posted, and made available to the media, in a room containing
34. See id. at 308-10.
35. Id. at 311.
36. Id.
37. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
38. See id. at 102-03 (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)
and Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977)).
39. See id. at 99.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 103-04.
42. Id. at 103.
43. See id. at 104-05.
44. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
45. See supra note 13 (text of statute).
46. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 529.
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signs stating that rape victims' names "were not matters of public record,
and were not to be published."'47 One of the newspaper's reporters cop-
ied the police report verbatim and gave the report to another reporter
who included B.J.F's full name in an article about the crime.48 This dis-
closure, which the newspaper claimed was inadvertent, violated the
newspaper's own internal policy of not publishing sexual offense victims'
names.
49
In concluding that the imposition of damages on the newspaper vio-
lated the First Amendment, the Court noted first that Cox Broadcasting
was not controlling in determining the outcome of Florida Star "[d]espite
the strong resemblance" between the two cases.5" Second, in Cox Broad-
casting, the Court did not address broader questions that were later in-
troduced in Florida Star and limited its focus to the publication of
information derived from " 'public records-more specifically, from judi-
cial records which are maintained in connection with a public prosecu-
tion and which themselves are open to public inspection.' ""
Consistent with its previous analysis of press-and-privacy cases in a
"discrete factual context,"' 52 the Court used the limited First Amend-
ment standard that it fashioned in Daily Mail: "'[I]f a newspaper law-
fully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance
then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the in-
formation, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest
order.' "I'
1. Selecting and Applying the Daily Mail Standard
The Court cited three reasons for why it supported the Daily Mail
standard.54 First, because the Daily Mail standard protects only the pub-
47. Id. at 546 (White, J., dissenting).
48. See id. at 527. The article read as follows:
[B.J.F.] reported on Thursday, October 20, she was crossing Brentwood Park,
which is in the 500 block of Golfair Boulevard, enroute to her bus stop, when
an unknown black man ran up behind the lady and placed a knife to her neck
and told her not to yell. The suspect then undressed the lady and had sexual
intercourse with her before fleeing the scene with her 60 cents, Timex watch
and gold necklace. Patrol efforts have been suspended concerning this incident
because of a lack of evidence.
Ia
49. See id at 528.
50. Ia at 532. The Court explained that Cox Broadcasting involved the acquisition of
the rape victim's name from the courthouse records. The Court invalidated the chal-
lenged damages award in that case because it considered that the press plays a significant
role in scrutinizing trials and thereby enhancing their fairness. In contrast, the Court did
not consider the press' role to be "directly compromised" in Florida Star because the
information in that case was derived from a police report prepared and released prior to
any adversarial proceeding, and before the identification of a suspect. See id
51. Ia at 533 (quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975)).
52. Ia at 530.




lication of lawfully obtained information, the government still retains
methods of safeguarding sensitive information, such as a rape victim's
name, from disclosure." According to the Court, "[t]he government
may classify certain information, establish and enforce procedures ensur-
ing its redacted release, and extend a damages remedy against the gov-
ernment or its officials where the government's mishandling of sensitive
information leads to its dissemination. ' 56 Thus, the government bears
the responsibility for prohibiting dissemination of facts it considers to be
private, "a less drastic means than punishing truthful publication."57 As
the Court later noted, such a standard could have applied in the circum-
stances in the case presented before it, since Florida's statute was "under-
cut" by the Sheriff's Department's erroneous, albeit inadvertent,
inclusion of B.J.F.'s name in an incident report.58
Second, as the Court noted in Cox Broadcasting,59 penalizing the press
for disseminating publicly available information is not likely to serve the
State's interest. As the Court stated, " '[b]y placing the information in
the public domain on official court records, the State must be presumed
to have concluded that the public interest was thereby being served.' "I
Third, the Court emphasized the" 'timidity and self-censorship'" that
could stem from punishing the media for publishing true information.6'
Alternatively, the media would have the onerous task of determining
which government releases, reports, and other information warranted
lawful publication.62
Applying the first prong of this three-part standard, the Court con-
cluded that the newspaper "'lawfully obtain[ed] truthful information
about a matter of public significance' ,63 for three reasons: (1) the news-
paper "lawfully obtained B.J.F.'s name"; 64 (2) the news account of
B.J.F.'s assault was accurate; 65 and (3) the news article pertained to "'a
matter of public significance' "66 because it concerned a "matter of para-
mount public import: the commission, and investigation, of a violent
crime which had been reported to authorities."'67
Concerning the second part of the standard, whether imposing liability
serves " 'a need to further a state interest of the highest order,' ,61 the
Court emphasized that there are "highly significant" state interests in a
55. See id. at 534.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 538.
59. See id. at 535.
60. Id. (quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975)).
61. Id. (quoting Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 496).
62. See id. at 536.
63. Id. (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. Id. (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 103).
67. Id. at 537.
68. Id. (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103).
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rule punishing the publication of a rape victim's name. These interests
included the privacy and physical safety of victims who may be at risk of
retaliation if their names are published, and the need to encourage such
victims to report rapes free from the fear of exposure.6 9
Because of these interests, the Court did not discount the chance that,
"in a proper case, imposing civil sanctions for publication of the name of
a rape victim might be so overwhelmingly necessary to advance these
interests as to satisfy the Daily Mail standard."7 0 Nonetheless, given the
particular circumstances in Florida Star, the Court concluded that im-
posing civil sanctions was too extreme a method of promoting these in-
terests. Therefore, the Court was not convinced that there was a "need"
under the Daily Mail standard.7
2. Reasons for Not Imposing Liability in Florida Star
The Court discussed three reasons for not imposing liability in Florida
Star. First, as it had stated previously, 2 because the government pro-
vided the information to the media, it could be assumed that the govern-
ment had available a more restricted means of preventing dissemination
than "the extreme step of punishing truthful speech."73
Second, the negligence per se standard applied under the civil cause of
action implied from the Florida statute would be overinclusive because
liability would result automatically from publication.74 This result
would occur even under the following circumstances: if the victim's
identity is already known in the community; if the victim voluntarily
announced her identity; or if the victim's identity has become a "reason-
able subject" of the public's interest-because, for example, there is some
question that the victim may have fabricated the assault." The Court
emphasized its disallowance of such "categorical prohibitions" upon the
69. See id. During trial, B.J.F. testified that
she had suffered emotional distress from the publication of her name. She
stated that she had heard about the article from fellow workers and acquaint-
ances; that her mother had received several threatening phone calls from a man
who stated that he would rape B.J.F. again; and that these events had forced
B.J.F. to change her phone number and residence, to seek police protection, and
to obtain mental health counseling.
Id at 528.
70. Id. at 537.
71. See i.
72. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
73. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 538 (1989).
74. See id. at 539. Justice White disagreed with the Court's determination of this
standard, stating that the jury found that the newspaper had "acted with 'reckless indif-
ference towards the rights of others.'" It at 548 (White, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
75. See i. at 539. As one commentator noted, under the Florida statute, Vanity Fair
and People Weekly could be punished for their consensual interviews with the alleged
victims in the William Kennedy Smith and Mike Tyson cases. See Haughwout, supra
note 16, at 743.
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media's access to information in other cases 76
Third, because the Florida statute was underinclusive, the Court ques-
tioned whether it served the significant interests of rape victims.77 As the
Court noted, the statute only prohibited information presented in an "in-
strument[] of mass communication, "78 an undefined term. Therefore, an
individual who disseminates a rape victim's name by other means would
not be covered by the statute, even though such means of communication
would be comparably devastating. 79 The Court stressed the need for an
evenhanded application of the statute that would include both the
"smalltime disseminator as well as the media giant."8
In holding that the newspaper was not liable to the rape victim, how-
ever, the Court emphasized that its conclusion was limited to the facts of
the case, thereby acknowledging the possibility that civil sanctions could
be imposed for the publication of a rape victim's name in a different
context.8
76. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 539 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
457 U.S. 596, 608 (1982) (finding overbroad and unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute
mandating courtroom closure during the testimony of a minor victim of a sexual assault,
claiming that the two interests asserted by the state-the protection of such minor vic-
tims from further embarrassment and harm, and the encouragement of such victims to
provide credible testimony--could be served by requiring the trial court to decide on a
case-by-case basis whether the minor child's situation necessitated closure)); see also Ar-
thur S. Frumkin, Note, The First Amendment and Mandatory Courtroom Closure in
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court: The Press' Right, the Child Rape Victim's
Plight, 11 Hastings Const. L.Q. 637 (1984) (contrasting the Supreme Court's holding in
Globe with the decision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts).
77. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989).
78. Id.
79. See id. According to the dissenters, however, the Florida statute excluded neigh-
borhood gossips presumably because the Florida legislature considered "instrument[s] of
mass communication" to be relatively more dangerous and intrusive. Id. at 549 (White,
J., dissenting). Furthermore, they contended that the civil action at issue was not for a
violation of the Florida statute but for the negligent publication of the victim's name.
Therefore, because the action should be considered as part of Florida privacy tort law, an
individual could be covered by the tort of publication of private facts, which Florida
recognized. See id. at 549-50 (White, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 540. Justice Scalia's concurrence focused on the issue of
underinclusiveness:
[A] law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest "of the highest order," and
thus as justifying a restriction upon truthful speech, when it leaves appreciable
damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited. In the present case, I
would anticipate that the rape victim's discomfort at the dissemination of news
of her misfortune among friends and acquaintances would be at least as great as
her discomfort at its publication by the media to people to whom she is only a
name. Yet the law in question does not prohibit the former in either oral or
written form. Nor is it at all clear, as I think it must be to validate this statute,
that Florida's general privacy law would prohibit such gossip.
Id. at 541-42 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Likewise, the Court had held in
Daily Mail that a statute punishing the publication of a juvenile offender's name in news-
papers was unconstitutional because it did not prohibit publication in the electronic me-
dia or any other type of publication. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S.
97, 104-05 (1979).
81. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541.
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Our holding today is limited. We do not hold that truthful publication
is automatically constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of
personal privacy within which the State may protect the individual
from intrusion by the press, or even that a State may never punish
publication of the name of a victim of a sexual offense. We hold only
that where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has
lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only
when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order .... 82
In sum, the Daily Mail standard set forth in Florida Star prompts
three inquiries for resolving the conflicting interests in the disclosure of a
rape victim's name in a particular case: (1) was the true information
"lawfully obtained"; (2) is the true information of "public significance";
and (3) is there a "state interest of the highest order" that is served by the
limitation on publication. 3
These inquiries and the Court's holding established Florida Star as one
in a series of cases, starting with Cox Broadcasting, that upheld the me-
dia's disclosure of truthful information even when that disclosure could
have potentially harmful consequences for crime victims.' Florida Star
was unexpectedly different, however, not because the Court found for the
media defendant, but because the Court used narrow and cautious lan-
guage that acknowledged the state's interest in protecting rape victims.85
The next Part of this Essay discusses possible interpretations of the
Florida Star holding in light of the arguments made by different com-
mentators, both for and against the disclosure of rape victims' names.
The purpose in presenting these arguments is not to reach a resolution,
but to set out the key issues in the debate between the freedom of the
press and the privacy of rape victims.
II. THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST DISCLOSING RAPE
VICTIMS' NAMES
Although numerous arguments have been made for and against dis-
closing rape victims' names, the purpose of this Part is to present a brief
commentary on those that appear most pertinent. The debate is largely
pitted between those commentators who claim that nondisclosure only
increases the stigma accorded to rape victims, and those who assert that
rape victims are deserving of special protection. A number of collateral
issues are also raised, including who or what institution should make the
decision to release a rape victim's name and what recourse is most fair
for the accused.
82. Idi
83. Haughwout, supra note 16, at 744.
84. See Marcus & McMahon, supra note 4, at 1028.
85. See id. According to Marcus and McMahon, "[Tlhe Court for the first time ap-
peared to recognize an important state interest in protecting the victims of sexual offenses
against the disclosure of their names to the public." Id
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A. Disclosing the Name Would Eliminate the Stigma of Rape
According to Michael Gartner, president of NBC News, society's in-
correct impressions and stereotypes about rape can be eliminated if the
press more fully informs viewers and readers about the key facts in a rape
case including, in most circumstances, the rape victim's name.8 6 Geneva
Overholser, editor of The Des Moines Register, agrees, claiming that soci-
ety contributes to rape's stigma by treating rape differently from other
crimes." She compares, for example, the failure to disclose a rape vic-
tim's name to the failure to reveal that an individual's death resulted
from AIDS.88 In both cases, the stigma is perpetuated because the infor-
mation is considered to be devastating.89
Similarly, others have commented that maintaining anonymity is a
"demeaning form of self-censorship," 90 that puts the rape victim in a
category apart from other violent crime victims, thereby perpetuating
sexist stereotypes.91 Such isolation also implies that being raped is dis-
graceful. 92 As Karen DeCrow, former president of the National Organi-
zation for Women has stated, "[n]ow is the time for us to understand
that keeping the hunted under wraps merely establishes her as an outcast
and implies that her chances for normal social relations are doomed for-
ever more. Pull off the veil of shame. Print the name." 93
This perspective was reinforced when, in the spring of 1990, a year
before the William Kennedy Smith incident, a story about a rape victim
published in The Des Moines Register94 won the Pulitzer prize. The
story described the ordeal of Nancy Ziegenmeyer, a twenty-nine year-old
Iowa housewife and mother of three who was raped in her car by a stran-
ger.95 Ziegenmeyer decided to go public with her story after reading an
editorial by Overholser in The Des Moines Register, contending that rape
victims should reveal their identities in order to eliminate the stigma of
rape.9
6
Other commentators counter these arguments, however, emphasizing
the potential stigma and long term trauma experienced by rape victims. 97
They note first that Ziegenmeyer, not the media, made the decision to go
86. See Gartner, supra note 2, at 6A.
87. See Warren, supra note 6, at 5.
88. See Jones, supra note 1, at A18.
89. See id.
90. Warren, supra note 6, at C5.
91. See id.
92. See Marcus & McMahon, supra note 4, at 1031; Nix, supra note 11, at Al.
93. Karen DeCrow, Stop Treating Rape Victims as Pariahs; Print Names, USA To-
day, Apr. 4, 1990, at 8A.
94. See Jane Schorer, It Couldn't Happen to Me: One Woman's Story, Des Moines
Reg., Feb. 25 - Mar. 1, 1990, at IA (series of five articles).
95. See id.
96. See Geneva Overholser, American Shame: The Stigma of Rape, Des Moines Reg.,
July 11, 1989, at 6A.
97. See Jones, supra note 1, at A18.
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public with her case.98 Furthermore, although Ziegenmeyer was hailed
for her courage,99 she now claims that she would have never reported the
crime if she had known at the time it occurred that her identity would be
disclosed."o° She emphasizes that "[s]peaking out publicly is not for all
victims."' '  Furthermore, "[n]o one should dictate to rape victims that
they should speak out. It must be their choice.""0 2
Other commentators emphasize evidence that "most public disclosures
tend to reinforce rather than dispel sexual assault stereotypes,' 0 3 for a
variety of reasons. First, the great majority of rapes are committed by an
acquaintance or relative and, therefore, the consent of the victim is often
presumed." As a result, the victim may be rejected by friends or family
or may appear unreliable to employers."10 Indeed, The National Wo-
men's Study, a three-year longitudinal survey of a national probability
sample of 4008 adult American women" 6 showed that over two-thirds of
the women surveyed were "somewhat" or "extremely" concerned about
the following: their family knowing that they were raped (seventy-one
percent); people thinking that the rape was their fault or that they were
responsible for it (sixty-nine percent); or non-family members knowing
they were raped (sixty-eight percent).1"7 Based on these and other re-
sults, the study concluded that
[i]t is clear that rape victims are extremely concerned about people
finding out and finding reasons to blame them for the rape. If the
stigma of rape were not still a very real concern in victims' eyes, per-
haps fewer victims in America would be concerned about invasion of
their privacy and other disclosure issues.' 08
Because of these circumstances, the majority of raped women who vol-
untarily reveal their identities are white, middle class, in steady relation-
ships, and most significantly, are raped by strangers."' 9 These women
are far less apt to be stigmatized.
The remaining counter argument focuses on the assignment to rape
98. See Marcus & McMahon, supra note 4, at 1035.
99. See Jane Schorer, Rape Story: A Flood of Positive Reactions, Des Moines Reg.,
Mar. 3, 1990, at 2A.
100. See Rogers Worthington, Identifying Rape Victims Sparks Row, Chi. Trib., July
29, 1990, at C15.
101. Jane Shorer & Marta McCave, Rape Victim Finds Public Helps Heal, USA To-
day, Mar. 7, 1990, at 2A.
102. Feedback- Other Views on the Crime of Rape, USA Today, July 20, 1990, at 13A.
103. Marcus & McMahon, supra note 4, at 1032-33.
104. See Dana Berliner, Rethinking the Reasonable Belief Defense to Rape, 100 Yale
L.. 2687, 2687 (1991).
105. See Marcus & McMahon, supra note 4, at 1033.
106. See National Victim Ctr. and Crime Victims Research and Treatment Ctr., Rape
in America: A Report to the Nation (Apr. 23, 1992) [hereinafter Rape in America] (report-
ing the results of The National Women's Study).
107. See id. at 4.
108. Id
109. See Marcus & McMahon, supra note 4, at 1033.
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victims the task of enlightening society about rape. As some commenta-
tors have asked: "[W]hy must the victim, who has already suffered from
the ordeal of rape, be forced to bear the responsibility of educating soci-
ety and changing its prejudicial view toward rape and its victims?" 110
They contend that change must come from the individuals in society who
hold stereotypical views about rape, not from the victims themselves."'
As Ziegenmeyer notes further, "[w]e're not going to lessen the stigma byjust publishing victims' names. We need to educate society to what rape
is.,, 112
B. The Name Adds Credibility to the Story (or Journalists'
Commitment to the Facts)
According to Gartner, names and facts are news that make readers
better informed." 3 "'[T]he more we tell our viewers, the better in-
formed they will be in making up their own minds about the issues in-
volved. We do not mean to be judgmental or to take sides; we are merely
reporting what we have learned.' "1"4 Moreover facts such as names
make a story more credible. "'As wounding as revealing her name may
be it's news. Specifics add credibility to the story.' "15 Overholser adds
that the withholding of facts "'goes against everything we believe as
journalists in terms of commitment to printing the facts as we know
them.' ,116
Opponents claim that this argument lacks merit. First, news organiza-
tions are able to provide specific details of an alleged rape based upon
police reports, court files, and judicial proceedings. Other personal facts
can be gathered through interviews with those who know the victim. If
the press provides this kind of information, the victim's name becomes
superfluous for making a story credible.' 1 7
C. Withholding the Name Stems from Male Chauvinism
According to some commentators, the withholding of rape victims'
names is the result of male chauvinism. "The newspaper publisher is big
daddy saying, 'Don't you worry, little lady,'" according to Henry G.
Gay, publisher of the Shelton-Mason County Journal in Washington, one
of the few newspapers that discloses the names of rape victims as well as
the names of all witnesses at trials. 118
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. Feedback Other Views on the Crime of Rape, supra note 102, at 13A.
113. See Gartner, supra note 2, at 6A.
114. On Names in Rape Cases, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1991, at A17 (quoting Michael
Gartner).
115. Nix, supra note 11, at Al (quoting Michael Gartner).
116. Jones, supra note 1, at A18 (quoting Geneva Overholser).
117. See Marcus & McMahon, supra note 4, at 1034-35.
118. Jones, supra note 1, at A18.
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A Boston Globe staff writer contends, however, that this perspective
assumes a "post-shame society."" 9 Although a social goal may be to
identify the victims of rape as readily as those of theft, to do so now
would push back any progressive changes made so far.120 "[P]rivacy is
the covered bridge we need to cross over to the time when rape is indeed
treated by the public like any other assault."12
D. News Directors Should Make Editorial Decisions About Names,
Not Courts or Legislatures
According to Gartner, producers, editors, and news directors should
make editorial decisions, not the courts or legislatures. For this reason,
he opposes military censorship, legislative mandate, and the policies of
most organizations to suppress printing rape victims' names. As he em-
phasizes, there is no other news category that allows an individual the
choice of remaining anonymous."2
This perspective may be considered open to question, however, if edi-
torial judgments differ from the public's desires, which appears to be the
case. Polls show that most individuals support editorial policies that pro-
tect rape victims' names. For example, when the New York Daily News
invited readers to call in their opinions concerning whether NBC's deci-
sion to disclose the alleged victim's name in the William Kennedy Smith
case was appropriate, seventy-five percent of the nearly one thousand re-
spondents said they opposed NBC's decision.123 In addition, a USA To-
day poll taken after the accuser's name was released reported that ninety-
one percent of the 633 adults questioned by Gordon S. Black, Corp., said
that rape victims, not news organizations, should decide whether to dis-
close their identity.24
E. Disclosure is Justified if the Name Is Already Disclosed
Many news organizations, including The New York Times, stated that
they disclosed the name of William Kennedy Smith's accuser because her
name had already been released to the general public.1 5 The Times ex-
119. Ellen Goodman, Pursuing Justice Protecting Privacy, Boston Globe, Apr. 18,
1991, at 13.
120. See id.
121. Id. As a counselor with San Francisco Women Against Rape similarly argued:
Rape is different from other crimes and should be treated differently .... Face
it, it isn't the same as having your wallet stolen. If you're the victim of a theft
or mugging, no one will look at you cross-eyed and blame you, ask you what
you were doing in that part of town, or why you were wearing tight clothes, or
what you did to deserve it.
Nix, supra note 11, at Al.
122. See Gartner, supra note 2, at 6A.
123. See Gail Fitzer, Debate Rages Over Media Decision to Name Alleged Rape Victim,
Reuters, Apr. 18, 1991.
124. See Sandra Sanchez, Rape Polk No Names, Say 91%, USA Today, Apr. 18, 1991,
at IA.
125. See Nix, supra note 11, at Al.
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plained its reasoning as follows:
Like many other news organizations, The New York Times ordinarily
shields the identities of complainants in sex crimes, while awaiting the
courts' judgment about the truth of their accusations. The Times has
withheld [the accuser's] name until now, but editors said yesterday
that NBC's nationwide broadcast took the matter of her privacy out of
their hands. 126
According to William German, executive editor of The San Francisco
Chronicle, the accuser's name was "clearly in the public domain" once it
had been broadcast by NBC and printed in The New York Times and
other major publications. 127 "The name itself became part of the news
story and controversy. Continuing to withhold the name from our read-
ers served no real purpose in this case." '128
In contrast, critics said that by claiming NBC's broadcast "took the
matter of [the victim's] privacy out of their hands," 29 The Times did not
deserve whatever credit might have been attributed to Gartner for his
original decision to disclose.130 As Susan Estrich, a professor at the Uni-
versity of Southern California Law Center, commented, The Times-
"like any thoughtful toddler"-merely used NBC's broadcast as a reason
for following the network's decision to disclose. 13'
Notably, The Times' editors also may have been influenced by their
expectation that most of the other mainstream news organizations would
be publishing the victim's name. 132 This was not the case, however, as
The Toronto Star made known in its assessment of the chain of media
events concerning the William Kennedy Smith trial. "It was clear the
journalistic world had been turned upside down yesterday when Dan
Schwartz, editor of the National Enquirer, said of the New York Times:
'I think we took a more ethical stand than they did.' """3 The National
Enquirer and comparable news organizations continued to refuse to print
the accuser's name. 1 3 4
Yet, critics have contended that giving original credit to NBC could
also be considered unwarranted. For example, Gartner explained that he
made the decision to reveal the accuser's name because it "was well
known in the Palm Beach area."' 31 Yet, the NBC affiliate in West Palm
Beach announced an on-the-air objection to disclosing the victim's name
126. On Names in Rape Cases, supra note 114, at A17.
127. Nix, supra note 11, at Al.
128. Id.
129. On Names in Rape Cases, supra note 114, at A17.
130. See Glaberson, supra note 1, at A14.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. Howard Kurtz, Naming Woman in Rape Case Ignites Debate, Toronto Star, Apr.
18, 1991, at A30.
134. See id.
135. Carmody, supra note 3, at A22.
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prior to the NBC Nightly News broadcast. 136 Furthermore, given Es-
trich's analogy, it could be contended that NBC News was also just an-
other "toddler" following the lead taken from the two earlier tabloid
reports.
F. Withholding the Name Is Not Fair to the Accused
According to Alan Dershowitz, a Harvard Law School professor,
withholding the name not only further stigmatizes rape, 13 it also endan-
gers the civil liberties of those who are accused for two reasons: (1) it
implies that the unnamed person was indeed a victim and, therefore, (2)
hinders the presumption that the defendant is innocent.1 31
"People who have gone to the police and publicly invoked the criminal
process and accused somebody of a serious crime such as rape must be
identified.... In this country there is no such thing and should not be
such a thing as anonymous accusation. If your name is in court it is a
logical extension that it should be printed in the media. How can you
publish the name of the presumptively innocent accused but not the
name of the accuser?" ' 139
Likewise, Gartner states that the alleged victim should be treated jour-
nalistically in the same way as the accused. For example, because Wil-
liam Kennedy Smith's reputation became a matter of debate and
scrutiny, the accuser should be in a comparable position.4 °
Others counter that the issue is not always whether the alleged victim's
name is published, but the context in which the media publishes it. Ac-
cording to Karen Jurgenson, a senior editor of USA Today and also the
victim of a gunpoint rape attack, revealing details of the accuser's life and
creating the implication that she was responsible "doesn't balance the
media attention the men in the case have received. It only takes the case
to greater lows. 14 1
The sounder alternative, however, may be to enact legislation protect-
ing the names of both the accused and the accuser, an approach poten-
tially acceptable to both sides in an alleged rape case. This approach has
received some support from a recent survey conducted with respondents
from a national probability sample of 370 agencies that provide crisis
counselling to rape victims. The survey found that nearly two-thirds
(sixty-three percent) of the rape crisis counselling agencies supported
136. See iL
137. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Letter to the Editor, Boston Globe, Mar. 2, 1984, at 10.
138. See iL
139. Roger Cohen, Should the Media Name the Accuser When the Crime Being
Charged Is Rape?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1991, § 4, at 4 (quoting Alan M. Dershowitz).
140. See Gartner, supra note 2, at 6A. Allan M. Siegal, an assistant managing editor of
The Times, acknowledged that as the William Kennedy Smith case progressed, the paper
found itself in the "uncomfortable position of naming the accused when [it was] not nam-
ing the accuser." Carmody, supra note 3, at A22.
141. Karen Jurgensen, The Real Issue: How Does Our Country Create So Many Rap-
ists?, USA Today, Apr. 18, 1991, at 10A.
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laws prohibiting the disclosure of the names of those accused of rape
until after an arrest is made. However, only forty percent of the agen-
cies' respondents favored laws withholding the names of those accused
until after indictment, and only twenty-four percent until after
conviction. 142
G. Non-Disclosure Laws Will Not Encourage the Reporting of Rape
According to one commentator, non-disclosure laws have failed to
protect the privacy of rape victims. The number of reported and unre-
ported rapes continues to climb, even in those states that punish the me-
dia for disclosure.143 "It therefore could be concluded that protecting
the identity of victims has not affected the prosecution of offenders and
has not affected the reporting of crimes." 1"
This argument may be too narrow, however. First, it ignores the fact
that ninety to ninety-five percent of the media have non-disclosure poli-
cies irrespective of the law of the particular state where they are based. 145
Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that the small group of news
organizations that do disclose are sufficiently close to one another geo-
graphically that they could have a measurable impact on the rape report-
ing rates of women in any particular area. Large scale surveys or case
studies of individual rape victims, therefore, appear to be the more in-
formative alternative.
Second, experts are "undecided" about whether the stable increase in
rapes reported to the police over the past few years can be attributed to a
higher incidence of sexual assault or an enhanced willingness to re-
port.146 Again, deciphering the effect of this reporting behavior is
difficult.
Third, The National Women's Study reported that seventy-six percent
of the American women and seventy-eight percent of the rape victims
surveyed favored legislation that prohibited the media from disclosing
rape victims' names. 147 One-half of the rape victims questioned also said
that they would be "a lot more likely" to report rapes if the media were
prevented by law from acquiring and revealing their names and ad-
dresses. 148 Another sixteen percent were "somewhat more likely" to re-
port under these circumstances, 149 making a total of sixty-six percent
who would be more likely to report rapes if their identities would be
protected. Moreover, eighty-six percent of all those surveyed thought
142. See Rape in America, supra note 106, at 10.
143. See Haughwout, supra note 16, at 749.
144. Id.
145. See supra note I and accompanying text.
146. See Helaine Olen & Ronald J. Ostrow, Date-Rape Gains Attention After Years As
Taboo Topic, L.A. Times, Apr. 23, 1991, at Al.
147. See Rape in America, supra note 106, at 9.
148. See id. at 6.
149. See id.
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that victims would be "less likely" to report rapes if those victims be-
lieved that the news media would disclose their names., °
Based on these data and in light of the considerable publicity sur-
rounding the William Kennedy Smith case, The Women's Study reached
the following conclusion:
During the past year, several high profile rape cases received vast pub-
licity, with several respected news agencies straying from their stan-
dard wise policies of not disclosing rape victims' names. The argument
has been made that disclosing rape victims' names would "destigma-
tize" the crime of rape and encourage victims to report rapes to police.
It is extremely significant that rape victims appear to strongly disagree
with this argument.... [Moreover,] [i]t appears that women arejust as
likely in recent years to fear negative evaluation by others if a rape is
disclosed, and are more concerned about the possibility of their names
being made public. 151
CONCLUSION
This Essay's examination of the Supreme Court's support for the press'
right to disclose, plus commentary on key issues relating to the privacy
versus free press debate, raises several questions. Should the public's or
the rape victims' strong support for non-disclosure curtail the media, or
should news organizations continue to be allowed to disclose? Should
there be alternatives to traditional non-disclosure laws, such as laws en-
suring non-disclosure for both perpetrators and victims? Should the me-
dia ultimately have access to the names of rape victims and the choice
thereafter to publish, or will future courts and state statutes begin to
withhold names from public access? If states do indeed begin to protect
such information, should they or the media be liable if such information
is disclosed? Under what specific circumstances should rape victims'
names not be disclosed? If special legislation is enacted for rape victims,
should such legislation also apply to the victims of other sorts of crimes,
or alternatively, to the victims of potentially sensitive diseases?
These questions remain open for now, but courts will likely confront
them at some point in the future. At that time, courts will need to con-
sider how differently rape victims should be treated from other kinds of
crime victims, and whether the non-disclosure net should be broadened
to include others (including non-crime victims) whose identities, when
revealed, could result in emotional or physical harm. In leaving these
questions open, we turn next to our panel speakers for their thoughts on
the social and legal complexities of rape victims' privacy rights.
150. See id.
151. Id
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